Risk Prevention and Policy-Making in Automatic Systems

Accidents with automatic production systems are reported to be on the order of one in a hundred or thousand robot-years, while fatal accidents are found to occur one or two orders of magnitude less frequently. Traditions in occupational safety tend to seek for safety targets in terms of zero severe accidents for automatic systems. Decision-making requires a risk assessment balancing potential risk reduction measures and costs within the cultural environment of a production company. This paper presents a simplified procedure which acts as a decision tool. The procedure is based on a risk concept approaching prevention both in a deterministic and in a probabilistic manner. Eight accident scenarios are shown to represent the potential accident processes involving robot interactions with people. Seven prevention policies are shown to cover the accident scenarios in principle. An additional probabilistic approach may indicate which extra safety measures can be taken against what risk reduction and additional costs. The risk evaluation process aims at achieving a quantitative acceptable risk level. For that purpose, three risk evaluation methods are discussed with respect to reaching broad consensus on the safety targets.     

Does a Reactor Need a Safety Backfit? Case Study on Communicating Decision and Risk Analysis Information to Managers

An approach to communicating decision and risk analysis findings to managers is illustrated in a real case context. This article consists essentially of a report prepared for senior managers of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to help them make a reactor safety decision. It illustrates the communication of decision analysis findings relating to technical risks, costs, and benefits in support of a major risk management decision: whether or not to require a safety backfit. Its focus is on the needs of decision makers, and it introduces some novel communication devices.     

Learning from the Piper Alpha Accident: A Postmortem Analysis of Technical and Organizational Factors

The accident that occurred on board the offshore platform Piper Alpha in July 1988 killed 167 people and cost billions of dollars in property damage. It was caused by a massive fire, which was not the result of an unpredictable "act of God" but of an accumulation of errors and questionable decisions. Most of them were rooted in the organization, its structure, procedures, and culture. This paper analyzes the accident scenario using the risk analysis framework, determines which human decision and actions influenced the occurrence of the basic events, and then identifies the organizational roots of these decisions and actions. These organizational factors are generalizable to other industries and engineering systems. They include flaws in the design guidelines and design practices (e.g., tight physical couplings or insufficient redundancies), misguided priorities in the management of the tradeoff between productivity and safety, mistakes in the management of the personnel on board, and errors of judgment in the process by which financial pressures are applied on the production sector (i.e., the oil companies' definition of profit centers) resulting in deficiencies in inspection and maintenance operations. This analytical approach allows identification of risk management measures that go beyond the purely technical (e.g., add redundancies to a safety system) and also include improvements of management practices.     

The Risks of Using Nuclear Energy Sources in Space: Some Lay Activists'Perceptions

A combination of directive and nondirective techniques was used to study the mental models of 30 lay activists regarding the risks of nuclear energy sources in space. Respondents'perceptions were compared with an "expert model" of the processes generating and controlling these risks, in terms of both the substance of their beliefs and several statistical measures of their performance. These analyses revealed a complex pattern of strengths and weaknesses. Their details are used to derive recommendations for formulating messages about these risks.     

Public Distrust and Hazard Management Success at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant

Based on experience gained while serving a public oversight commission appointed by the governor of Colorado, hazard management at the Department of Energy's Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant is reviewed. Specific reference is made to the plant's history of controversy, its defense-in-depth strategy of hazard control, occupational health issues, public exposure to plutonium, and the assessment of low-probability, high-consequence risks. This leads to the conclusion that Rocky Flats is, by any objective standard, a hazard management success. It follows that public distrust of Rocky Flats arises as much from fear and loathing of nuclear weapons themselves as from the manufacturing process by which they are made.     

A Review of Plant Specific PRAs

A large number of PRA studies have been completed for specific plants at specific sites. From these studies, taken individually or collectively, many significant insights have evolved into items important to risk and safety. The content of this paper is primarily based on the material contained in the EPRI funded review of five PRA studies: Big Rock Point, Zion, Limerick, Grand Gulf, and Arkansas Nuclear One. The first three were the utility sponsored studies publicly available at the time of project initiation while the other two were deemed representative of the NRC's RSSMAP and IREP programs respectively. The results of PRA studies are usually expressed in terms of core melt frequencies, radionuclide release frequencies, and frequencies of occurrence of different reactor accident consequences (e.g., early and latent fatalities) depending on the level of PRA. These subjects are prominently addressed in this paper. One of the results of a PRA study is identification of a relatively small number of accident sequences that represent the dominant contributors to core melt. An analysis of the salient features of the dominant accident sequences from eleven PRA's yielded a characterization of accident sequence categories discussed at some length. Impact of external events is discussed very briefly. Next to an explicit quantification of public risk or core melt frequency, the identification of specific safety concerns and the evaluation of possible solutions to implement risk management are probably the best recognized and most widely used applications of PRA. Several illustrative examples are briefly discussed. Human interactions are extremely important contributors to safety and reliability of the plants. A review of PRA studies concluded that it was necessary to account for five types of human interactions; some of which may mitigate while others may exacerbate an accident sequence.     

Car Occupant Life Expectancy: Car Mass and Seat Belt Effects

Average human life expectancies for the U.S. resident population are calculated using tabulated population and survival rate data. These life expectancies are recalculated assuming elimination of various types of motor vehicle fatalities using Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) data. The differences between the original and recalculated values provide estimates of life expectancy reductions due to the motor vehicle fatalities. These estimates are combined with prior work relating the likelihood of an occupant fatality to car mass, so that reductions in life expectancy are determined as a function of car mass. The estimates of life expectancy reductions are also used to determine the effect of seat belt use on life expectancy. The estimates, which are based on data for 1978, assume that survival rates remain unchanged. Estimates of the changes in life expectancy associated with switching from a large (1800 kg) car to a small (900 kg) car, and switching from not using to using a seat belt are presented as functions of the age at which an individual makes the switch.     

利益分割时期的安全事故与政府改进问题

政府在事故预防和处置中居于主导地位.心理学的"华生模式"和"皮亚杰模式"实现"社会学转向",可用以分析政府的责任问题.而安全事故的"强刺激"和"弱刺激"对政府改进效应是不同的.中国当前社会转型中逐步出现了城乡、单位、地方之间而主要表现为阶层之间的利益分割局面.因而政府的责任一方面不仅仅在于对某一事故的"强刺激"进行反应性改进,更应该在于包括"弱刺激"在内逐步把内化以人为本的责任伦理和信念伦理结合起来,对事故进行事前预知和防范,同时另一方面需要抑制精英阶层对整个社会利益的割据,保障社会底层的安全权益,引导底层进行安全维权,乃至抗争上层"官商秩序(结构)"的利益勾结,打破"资(方)强劳(方)弱"、"上(层)强下(层)弱"结构,从消极的"华生模式"转向积极反应的"皮亚杰模式",不断提升政府效率,保障个体生命安全和社会安全.     

A Review of the High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository Siting Analysis

We critique two 1986 Department of Energy reports concerning the selection of sites for characterization as the nation's first high-level nuclear waste repository. We find that the multiattribute utility analysis of the five nominated sites was well done, although we express concern about the assessed probabilities, question the construction of two important attribute scales, and disagree with some of the value tradeoffs that were used. In contrast, we find the logic of the recommendations report to be weak and unconvincing.     

Analyzing Evacuation Versus Shelter‐in‐Place Strategies After a Terrorist Nuclear Detonation

We superimpose a radiation fallout model onto a traffic flow model to assess the evacuation versus shelter‐in‐place decisions after the daytime ground‐level detonation of a 10‐kt improvised nuclear device in Washington, DC. In our model, ≈80k people are killed by the prompt effects of blast, burn, and radiation. Of the ≈360k survivors without access to a vehicle, 42.6k would die if they immediately self‐evacuated on foot. Sheltering above ground would save several thousand of these lives and sheltering in a basement (or near the middle of a large building) would save of them. Among survivors of the prompt effects with access to a vehicle, the number of deaths depends on the fraction of people who shelter in a basement rather than self‐evacuate in their vehicle: 23.1k people die if 90% shelter in a basement and 54.6k die if 10% shelter. Sheltering above ground saves approximately half as many lives as sheltering in a basement. The details related to delayed (i.e., organized) evacuation, search and rescue, decontamination, and situational awareness (via, e.g., telecommunications) have very little impact on the number of casualties. Although antibiotics and transfusion support have the potential to save ≈10k lives (and the number of lives saved from medical care increases with the fraction of people who shelter in basements), the logistical challenge appears to be well beyond current response capabilities. Taken together, our results suggest that the government should initiate an aggressive outreach program to educate citizens and the private sector about the importance of sheltering in place in a basement for at least 12 hours after a terrorist nuclear detonation.